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Introduction 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. 
Lopez1 and United States v. Morrison,2 the lower courts have struggled 
to figure out whether federal statutes challenged under the Commerce 
Clause regulate “economic” activity or “noneconomic” activity. For the 
Lopez Court created a distinction between these categories of activities, 
and the Court applied this distinction in both of these cases to strike 
down federal statutes regulating noneconomic activity as beyond 
Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.3 Lopez and 
 
†  University Professor, Syracuse University. J.D. Yale Law School 1989. 
1. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
2. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
3. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 628 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the courts 
that decided the cases relied upon by the majority “did not focus on the 
economic nature of the activity regulated”). 
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Morrison strongly suggest that the Court will not give statutes 
regulating noneconomic activities the full measure of deferential review 
afforded federal statutes challenged under the Commerce Clause since 
the late New Deal, and may well strike them down.4 
Scholars agree that Lopez and Morrison offer no guidance about 
how to apply the economic/noneconomic distinction, leaving lower 
courts adrift when trying to figure out whether challenged federal sta-
tutes regulate economic activities or not.5 This view about the absence 
of guidance stems from the Supreme Court’s failure to explain why it 
categorized the activities regulated under the statutes it has invalidated 
as noneconomic activities.6 In Lopez, the Court stated that the Gun-
Free School Zones Act (GFSZA) regulated the activity of gun 
possession in school zones. It justified its characterization of gun po-
ssession as noneconomic by declaring that gun possession near schools 
has “nothing to do with . . . any sort of economic enterprise.”7 The 
Morrison Court concluded that the Violence Against Women Act re-
gulated “gender-related crimes” such as rape. In similar conclusory 
fashion, the Court declared that “gender-motivated crimes” do not 
constitute economic activity “in any sense of the phrase.”8 So, the 
scholarly consensus about the lack of guidance is understandable, 
having roots in the leading cases’ use of conclusory statements to justify 
characterization of the activities before them.9 
Nevertheless, this Article argues that Lopez and Morrison offer 
substantial guidance about the economic/noneconomic distinction’s 
meaning. This guidance stems not from explanation of the characteri-
zation of the activity that motivated these decisions (which is missing), 
 
4. See Mollie Lee, Environmental Economics: A Market Failure Approach to 
the Commerce Clause, 116 Yale L.J. 456, 458–59 (2006) (characterizing 
“recent Supreme Court cases” as suggesting that Congress may only regulate 
economic activity); cf. United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 623 (10th Cir. 
2006) (stating that a finding that a statute regulates an economic activity 
triggers a perhaps irrebuttable presumption of constitutionality). 
5. Lee, supra note 4, at 482 (noting that Morrison and Lopez provide “little 
guidance about how to determine whether a statute regulates economic 
activity”). 
6. Cf. id. at 465 (noting that “the Lopez Court did not explain what would 
make an activity economic”) (internal quotation omitted). 
7. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
8. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000). 
9. See Allan Ides, Economic Activity as a Proxy for Federalism: Intuition and 
Reason in United States v. Morrison, 18 Const. Comment. 563, 567 (2002) 
(noting that the Court’s conclusions about the noneconomic character of the 
activities at issue in Lopez and Morrison “rest on the judicial sense that 
there is really nothing to argue about”). 
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but primarily from the Lopez Court’s effort to distinguish prior 
precedent, an effort that was essential to obtaining a majority for its 
result. Prior to Lopez, the Court did not distinguish economic from 
noneconomic activity. The Lopez Court invented this dichotomy in 
order to distinguish an unrelieved decades-old line of precedent up-
holding all sorts of statutes as regulating activities having a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce.10 The Lopez Court distinguished all of 
those precedents by characterizing them as regulating economic 
activity.11 Thus, we know that all regulated activities that the Court 
has characterized as affecting interstate commerce constitute economic 
activities. Moreover, the Lopez Court examined some of this precedent 
and explained what (economic) activities those cases addressed, thereby 
giving the lower courts valuable additional guidance about how one 
characterizes activities regulated under federal statutes. This Article 
elucidates the guidance offered in Lopez about how to distinguish 
economic from noneconomic activity. 
This Article, therefore, engages primarily in an analytical task. It 
does, however, take the analysis in a normative direction by asking 
what this guidance shows about the value and prospects of this new 
formalist distinction, which the dissenting Justices and many scholars 
have sharply criticized. 
Part I lays the groundwork, explaining the role of the economic/ 
noneconomic distinction in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. It then 
reviews scholarly concerns about the lack of guidance and the distinc-
tion’s theoretical unsoundness. 
Part II, the heart of the Article, parses the Lopez decision and the 
precedent it relies upon in creating the economic/noneconomic distinc-
tion, elucidating the guidance offered. It shows that the Lopez majority 
intended a rather capacious understanding of economic activity, and 
that this breadth played a key role in securing the concurrences of 
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor, which were essential to obtaining a 
majority in Lopez.12 At the same time, the Court imposed an important 
 
10. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 627 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the Court’s belief 
that the distinction between commercial and noncommercial transactions 
reconciles its holding with “earlier cases”). 
11. See id. at 559–60 (majority opinion) (stating that the cases evince a clear 
pattern of accepting regulation of economic activity affecting interstate 
commerce); id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (clearly implying that all 
“earlier cases” involved commercial activities or actors). 
12. Cf. Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 674, 695 (1995) 
(finding the commercial/noncommercial distinction essential to Kennedy and 
O’Connor’s votes). I agree with Professor Jones on this point but go further 
to show that Kennedy and O’Connor accepted the majority opinion not only 
because the majority distinguished economic from noneconomic activities, 
but also because they read the majority’s concept of economic activity as a 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 2·2016 
The Economic/Noneconomic Activity Distinction  
Under the Commerce Clause 
340 
limit on the concept of economic activity by rejecting the relevance of 
the regulated activity’s effects to the determination of whether the 
activity is economic. 
Part III addresses this analysis’s implications in both practical and 
theoretical terms. It critically examines the question of whether this 
guidance should substantially ameliorate concerns about arbitrariness 
and inconsistency. It also addresses the question of whether this 
guidance should allay critics’ concerns about the distinction’s theo-
retical soundness. 
I. The Role of the Economic/Noneconomic Distinction 
in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence 
This Part will provide the background needed to understand the 
economic/noneconomic distinction’s role in Commerce Clause juris-
prudence. It begins with some Commerce Clause history in order to 
introduce the problematic nature of formalist distinctions, which in-
forms reactions to the economic/noneconomic distinction.13 It then 
moves to a discussion of the role of the economic/noneconomic dis-
tinction in Lopez and its progeny. This Part concludes with a review of 
scholarly opinion and the dissents that they have echoed. This review 
demonstrates that scholars have agreed that the Court has provided no 
guidance to applying the economic/noneconomic distinction and that 
many of them have expressed more general concerns about the 
distinction’s theoretical soundness, as have the dissenting Justices in 
Lopez and Morrison. 
A. Experience with Formalist Distinctions under the Commerce Clause 
Scholars and judges view the economic/noneconomic distinction 
through the lens of prior experience with formalist distinctions.14 For 
 
broad one preserving prior case law that a narrower concept of economic 
activity would call into question. 
13. See generally Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce 
Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1089 (2000) (examining the roles 
of formalism and realism in the Commerce Clause jurisprudence from the 
Civil War to World War II). 
14. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 627–28 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority’s adoption of an economic/noneconomic distinction as a return to 
the formalist distinctions it rejected in the 1940s); Robert D. Cooter & Neil 
S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, 
Section 8, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 115, 118 (2010) (describing the economic/ 
noneconomic distinction as the latest in a series of “dubious formal 
distinctions”); Michael C. Dorf, The Good Society, Commerce, and the 
Rehnquist Court, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2161, 2175–76 (2001) (endorsing 
Justice Souter’s view that the economic/noneconomic distinction is like the 
old direct/indirect effects test); Merritt, supra note 12, at 679–81 (linking 
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that reason, some understanding of the history of Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence provides important background. 
Article I section 8 of the Constitution enumerates the limited pow-
ers of Congress.15 Clause 3 of that section empowers Congress to regu-
late commerce among the states and with foreign nations.16 Because 
this Commerce Clause power is much broader than the other listed 
powers, a conclusion that a particular matter lies outside the Commerce 
Clause authority often implies that it lies beyond the federal govern-
ment’s power altogether.17 Hence, the Commerce Clause’s interpreta-
tion plays an important role in establishing American federalism’s basic 
contours. 
The early Commerce Clause jurisprudence gave the Commerce 
Clause a liberal construction. In Gibbons v. Ogden, the Supreme Court 
construed the authority to regulate interstate commerce as reaching all 
“commercial intercourse” touching more than one state.18 The Gibbons 
Court suggested that Congress could regulate activities that affect other 
states, but not the “completely internal” commerce within a state.19 
The rise of federal regulatory power associated with nineteenth 
century progressivism and later, the early New Deal, gave rise to 
jurisprudence employing formalist distinctions to cabin the Commerce 
Clause’s reach. The Court during this period held that the Commerce 
Clause did not authorize federal regulation of “manufacturing” or 
“mining,” even when these activities produced goods to be shipped be-
tween states.20 It distinguished commerce in the narrow sense of trade 
or exchange from manufacturing and mining. Belying the formalism of 
 
the Lopez Court’s reading of the substantial effects test to proximate cause in 
tort law and therefore a resurrection of the indirect effects test). 
15. See U.S. Const. art. I. 
16. See id. art. I, § 8. 
17. See Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: The 
Impact of United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 Tenn. 
L. Rev. 605, 605 (2001) (noting that “the clear majority of federal legislation 
is enacted” under the Commerce Clause); cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 619–26 (2000) (examining the question of whether the 14th 
Amendment authorizes the Violence Against Women Act). 
18. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189–90 (1824). 
19. See id. at 194–95 (distinguishing between “completely internal” commerce 
within a state and “concerns” affecting the states generally). 
20. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1895) 
(prohibiting use of the Sherman Antitrust Act to thwart a sugar-refining 
monopoly because the Commerce Clause did not authorize regulation of 
manufacturing); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303–04 (1936) 
(invalidating regulation of coal miners’ wages and hours because the 
Commerce Clause may not reach production). 
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the cases forbidding federal regulation of production, the Court some-
times upheld regulation of intrastate activities on the ground that they 
directly affected interstate commerce.21 On the other hand, it rejected 
regulation of other intrastate activities that affected interstate 
commerce on the ground that they only did so indirectly.22 Thus, the 
Court’s decisions hinged on arbitrary formal distinctions between pro-
duction and commerce and between direct and indirect effects. These 
formalist distinctions made the jurisprudence unpredictable and seemed 
out of keeping with a functional understanding of the national economy, 
which new technologies and forms of business organization had 
transformed in ways that made activities in one state closely related to 
activities in other states. 
The Court also struggled during this period with the issue of 
whether the Commerce Clause only authorizes regulation for com-
mercial purposes. It struck down early progressive legislation prohibit-
ing child labor, which had a moral purpose of discouraging employment 
of young children.23 On the other hand, it upheld regulation combatting 
the moral evils of gambling,24 prostitution,25 and kidnapping.26 
After creating quite a bit of political controversy by striking down 
early New Deal legislation seeking to address the Great Depression,27 
 
21. See, e.g., Houston, East & West Texas R.R. Co. v. United States (The 
Shreveport Rate Cases), 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (upholding regulation of rail-
road rates for intrastate shipments). 
22. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 
523–25, 542–51 (1932) (invalidating regulation of diseased chicken sales 
because regulated work conditions only affected commerce indirectly); R.R. 
Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 368–69 (1935) (striking down 
requirements for pensions for railroad workers for lack of a “direct and 
intimate” relationship with commerce). 
23. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271–72 (1918) (striking down a 
statute prohibiting interstate shipment of goods made by children), 
overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116–17 (1941). 
24. Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903). 
25. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding the White Slave 
Traffic Act’s prohibition on taking a woman across state lines for immoral 
purposes). 
26. See, e.g., Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936) (upholding a federal 
kidnapping statute). 
27. See Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 
1933–1946, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 645, 677 (1946) (discussing President 
Roosevelt’s view of his reelection in 1936 as an endorsement of the regulatory 
program struck down by the Court and his proposal of a court packing plan 
to address the Court’s obstruction); see, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 
U.S. 238, 309 (1936) (invalidating regulation of coal’s price and miners’ 
wages and hours as having only an “indirect” effect on commerce); Schechter 
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the Court began to retreat from the formalist approach of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.28 The Court accepted Con-
gressional regulation of any activity substantially affecting interstate 
commerce whilst overruling the cases establishing the old formalist 
distinctions and prohibiting Commerce Clause regulation for moral 
purposes.29 And in deciding whether regulated activity affected inter-
state commerce, it deferred to Congress.30 The Court saw its role as 
deciding whether Congress could have had a rational basis for finding 
an effect on interstate commerce, even in cases where Congress had 
made no express findings about the relationship between regulated 
activities and commerce.31 This deferential approach dovetailed with a 
contemporaneous retreat from Lochner-era substantive due process 
jurisprudence.32 During the same period, the Court adopted a rational 
basis standard for judicial review of substantive due process claims.33 
The Court also judged this question of effects on interstate commerce 
 
Poultry, 295 U.S. at 548–49 (overruling a wage and hours law as having an 
indirect effect on commerce). 
28. See Stern, supra note 27, at 679–81 (describing the Jones & Laughlin case as 
repudiating the direct/indirect effects test and the prohibition on federal 
regulation of manufacturing in favor of a practical “actual experience” test). 
29. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120, 123–25 (1942) (rejecting the 
indirect effects test and declaring the question of whether a statute regulates 
“production” immaterial); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116–17 (1941) 
(overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 
301 U.S. 1, 38–40 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act even 
though it clearly regulates manufacturing). 
30. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 
U.S. 264, 276 (1981) (describing the Court’s role as “narrow” because of this 
deference to Congress). 
31. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (finding that 
Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination affects 
interstate commerce in spite of a lack of formal findings). 
32. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 606 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that a move to greater deference occurred simultaneously under 
the Commerce and Due Process clauses in 1937); cf. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton 
R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 344–74 (1935) (striking down obligations to pay railroad 
workers pensions on due process and Commerce Clause grounds). 
33. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 606–07 (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing the articulation 
of a rational basis test as occurring quite quickly in the due process realm 
and a few years later in the Commerce Clause cases); Stern, supra note 27, 
at 678–80 (noting that the Court decided the Jones & Laughlin case just a 
few weeks after the Court’s “amazing” decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish to overrule prior substantive due process jurisprudence). 
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by asking whether the activities regulated under a statute affect inter-
state commerce in the aggregate.34 The Court repeatedly declared the 
triviality of a particular plaintiff’s activity’s effects on commerce irrele-
vant.35 The Court, in effect, prohibited as-applied challenges to legis-
lation under the Commerce Clause.36 
The demise of formalist distinctions and the rise of rational basis 
review led to a consistent pattern of rejecting challenges to federal 
legislation on Commerce Clause grounds.37 Although federalism con-
cerns frequently led Congress to limit its own exercises of Commerce 
Clause power during this period, the era of judicial enforcement of limits 
on the scope of the most central enumerated power appeared to be 
over.38 
B. Lopez, Morrison, Raich, and the Economic/Noneconomic Distinction 
Against this backdrop, United States v. Lopez came as a surprise. 
In that case, the Supreme Court, for the first time in almost sixty years, 
struck down an act of Congress as beyond the Commerce Clause power. 
It subsequently struck down another act of Congress in United States 
 
34. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151–53 (1971) (describing the 
substantial effects test as the “class of activities” test); Wickard, 317 U.S. at 
127–28 (declaring the triviality of the plaintiff’s effect on commerce as 
irrelevant, when the effect of all regulated parties is “far from trivial”). 
35. See, e.g., Perez, 402 U.S. at 153–55 (noting the Court’s lack of power to 
excise trivial activities when a statute regulates a class of activities affecting 
interstate commerce and giving examples of cases based on that principle). 
36. David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding 
Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 808, 
884 (2004) (pointing out that the Court “disallows as-applied challenges” 
under the Commerce Clause). 
37. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 14, at 130 (noting that the Court upheld every 
statute challenged under the Commerce Clause between 1937 and 1995). 
38. See David A. Strauss, Commerce Clause Revisionism and the Affordable 
Care Act, 2012 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 1–2 (describing the lack of judicially 
enforceable limits on the Commerce Clause power as “the operating premise” 
of the Court’s jurisprudence between 1937 and 1995); see, e.g., California v. 
United States, 438 U.S. 645, 663–70 (1978) (discussing Congressional policy 
of making sure that federal reclamation projects did not interfere with 
traditional state control over private water rights); Manchester Envtl. Coal 
v. EPA, 612 F.2d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 1979) (explaining that Congressional 
concerns about “federal intrusion into the traditionally local domain of land 
use control” led to Clean Air Act amendments restricting EPA’s authority 
to demand land use restrictions protecting air quality); Herbert Wechsler, 
The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 
543 (1954). 
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v. Morrison. Both cases relied on a new formalist distinction, this one 
between economic and noneconomic activities. 
Lopez addresses a challenge to the GFSZA, which prohibited gun 
possession in or around schools, albeit with exceptions for school se-
curity guards and law enforcement officials.39 The Court begins its 
opinion by affirming the doctrine of enumerated powers, that Con-
gressional authority does have limits.40 Even during the modern era of 
rational basis review, the Court had acknowledged, albeit in dicta, that 
the Commerce Clause authority has judicially enforceable limits.41 The 
Lopez Court drew attention to this dicta, proclaiming that the 
Constitution requires a distinction between the truly national and truly 
local.42 
The opinion carries forward the work of giving the Court some role 
in limiting congressional Commerce Clause authority by cabining the 
post-New Deal jurisprudence into three formal, albeit broad, 
categories.43 The Lopez Court reaffirms much of the modern juris-
prudence by recognizing that Congress may regulate “the channels of 
interstate commerce[,] . . . the instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce,” and “activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”44 
By identifying three categories of activity that Congress may regulate, 
however, the Court implied that Congress cannot regulate activities 
outside these formal categories. Although all of these categories figure 
in the prior jurisprudence, and the typology comes from prior cases, the 
prior jurisprudence was considerably messier than this typology 
 
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(ii), (v) (2012) (exempting paid security 
guards’ economic activity from the GFSZA through school contract and 
qualified licensee exemptions). 
40. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (describing the 
enumerated powers doctrine as a first principle making the federal govern-
ment’s powers few and defined). 
41. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968), rev’d on other grounds, 
Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976), rev’d on other 
grounds, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547 
(1985) (acknowledging that the Commerce power has limits); NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (acknowledging that the 
power cannot extend to effects so “remote” that the extension “create[s] a 
completely centralized government”). 
42. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556–58. 
43. See id. at 558 (identifying “three broad categories of activity that Congress 
may regulate under its commerce power”). 
44. See id. at 558–59 (stating that the instrumentality part of the Lopez three-
part framework also authorizes regulation to “protect . . . persons or things 
in interstate commerce”). 
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implies.45 Accordingly, the cases anticipating the Lopez typology 
characterize these categories of activities as “problems” that the 
Commerce Clause reaches or as examples of the “plenary” nature of the 
power.46 And these earlier opinions carefully avoid the implication that 
these categories describe the totality of the power.47 Thus, the Lopez 
Court tried at once to accept the post-New Deal tradition and to limit 
it through the use of broad formal categories.48 
The Lopez opinion quickly concludes that the GFSZA does not re-
gulate Commerce’s “channels” or “instrumentalities.”49 Lopez then 
confirms the impression that the Court has reconstructed the main 
examples of problems arising under the Commerce Clause into firm 
limits on the scope of the power by stating that if that the GFSZA is 
to be upheld, it must be as a regulation of activities substantially 
 
45. See Robert A. Shapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: 
Power and Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1199, 1203 (2003) (claiming that the late New Deal case law accepts 
not just activities, but also the commercial effects of legislation, and the 
commercial nature of regulatory targets as a basis for finding substantial 
effects on interstate commerce). 
46. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 
264, 276 (1981) (mentioning these categories to illustrate why the plenary 
nature of the authority makes the judicial role in reviewing legislation under 
the Commerce Clause limited); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 
(1971) (stating that the “Commerce Clause reaches . . . three categories of 
problems”). 
47. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276 (using these categories to illustrate the principle 
that the Commerce Clause power has “no limitations other than are 
prescribed in the Constitution”) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824)); Perez, 402 U.S. at 150 (stating that the Commerce 
Clause power reaches these three categories of problem “in the main”). 
48. See Lee, supra note 4, at 465 (characterizing Lopez’s holding that Congress 
many only regulate three categories of activities as narrowing the Court’s 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause); Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing 
Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9 Lewis & 
Clark L. Rev. 823, 840 (2005) (identifying this approach’s purpose as 
grandfathering in old innovations, while creating authority to strike down 
new innovations). 
49. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. 
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affecting interstate commerce.50 Thus, if a statute does not fit in the 
three formal categories listed, it lies beyond the power of Congress.51 
This cabining, however, does not by itself threaten the GFSZA. 
For, as Justice Breyer’s dissent explains, Congress might have had a 
rational basis for thinking that the activity regulated by the GFSZA—
gun possession in school zones—substantially affects interstate 
commerce.52 After all, gun possession in school zones may lead to 
violence interfering with educating students, thereby limiting their 
future productivity and negatively influencing interstate commerce.53 
The Court, however, avoids this conclusion, partly through creation 
of a distinction between economic and noneconomic activity.54 First, it 
characterizes its cases upholding regulation of activities affecting 
interstate commerce as exhibiting a pattern of recognizing the validity 
of legislation regulating “economic” activity substantially affecting 
interstate commerce.55 Second, it declares that the GFSZA “has nothing 
to do with commerce or any sort of economic enterprise, however 
broadly one might define those terms.”56 Third, it points out that the 
provision outlawing gun possession is not “an essential part of a larger 
 
50. See id. A majority of the Justices recently reconfirmed this understanding of 
the categories’ exclusivity by declaring that the Affordable Care Act’s 
requirement that the uninsured purchase insurance could not be justified 
under the Commerce Clause because it does not regulate an existing activity 
(instead commanding a new activity). Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 
132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587–91, 2644 (2012) (finding the individual mandate 
beyond the Commerce Clause authority on that ground). This dictum did 
not determine the outcome of the case only because the Court ultimately 
upheld this “individual mandate” under the taxation authority. See id. at 
2598, 2629. 
51. See Merrill, supra note 48, at 839 (noting that “Justice Rehnquist cleverly 
transformed this description of prior precedent into a fixed menu of the 
permissible options available to Congress”). 
52. See Louis H. Pollak, Foreword, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 533, 547 (1995) (finding 
that the dissent “shows, beyond question” that Congress could rationally 
have found that gun possession near schools substantially affects interstate 
commerce). 
53. See Dorf, supra note 14, at 2172 (characterizing this point as “obvious” and 
not disputed by the majority); Merritt, supra note 12, at 698–99 
(characterizing this argument as the government’s strongest argument). 
54. See Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and 
Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 554, 564 (1995) 
(noting that the “leading cases . . . do not rely on . . . [the] commercial-
noncommercial distinction”). 
55. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (1995) (emphasis added). 
56. Id. at 561. 
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regulation of economic activity.”57 The Lopez Court uses this third 
point to distinguish cases, such as Wickard v. Filburn, which authorize 
regulation of “activities that arise out of or are connected with a 
commercial transaction,” which in the aggregate substantially affect 
interstate commerce.58 Thus, it suggests that it might not be willing to 
uphold regulation of noneconomic activities, even if those activities 
substantially affect interstate commerce. 
The Court, however, says almost nothing about why precisely gun 
possession does not constitute an economic activity, apparently con-
sidering its conclusion self-evident. The only hint is the language quoted 
above linking “economic activity” to activities having something to do 
with commerce or “economic enterprise.” But the Court concedes that 
“depending on the level of generality, any activity can be looked upon 
as commercial.”59 
Lopez also does not give a great deal of guidance about what precise 
function a finding that a law regulates noneconomic activity should 
play, beyond vaguely suggesting that regulation of noneconomic 
activity makes the law suspect. The Court does not expressly repudiate 
the substantial effects test, either generally or as applied to 
noneconomic activity. Instead, it rejects the chain of causation argu-
ment linking gun possession to a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce.60 It does not claim that the argument that gun possession sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce is factually wrong, nor does it 
expressly repudiate the rational basis test, which would seem to require 
upholding the GFSZA.61 Instead, the Court claims that accepting the 
chain of causation that the dissent articulates would lead to the demise 
of limits on the Commerce Clause power and authorize Congressional 
legislation in traditional areas of state sovereignty, such as crime, 
education, and family law.62 As Judith Resnik has pointed out, the 
 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 565. 
60. See id. at 564–67 (describing the dissent’s argument as “piling inference upon 
inference” and citing Schechter to support the idea that the Court’s “view of 
causation” must be limited). 
61. See Dral & Phillips, supra note 17, at 616–17 (explaining that Lopez and 
Morrison do not disavow the rational basis test, but apply “standards that 
clearly are stricter than rational basis”); Ides, supra note 9, at 578–79 
(suggesting that the actual impact of gun possession or gender-based crime 
on commerce may have been “irrelevant” to the Court’s decision); Merritt, 
supra note 12, at 682–83 (claiming that the “dissenters amply illustrated” 
that the “Gun-Free School Zones Act . . . easily pass[es] the weak rational 
basis test”). 
62. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565–66 (stating that the government’s rationale implies 
that the Court could regulate family law or crime, and finding the dissent’s 
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Court seems animated by a view of categorical federalisma view that 
separate judicially identifiable and enforceable state and federal 
categories of powers exist.63 Thus, Lopez creates an impression that the 
Court will scrutinize the links between noneconomic activity and 
interstate commerce with a more jaundiced eye than the rational basis 
test would suggest, at least where the law regulates in an area of 
traditional state dominance.64 
Lopez left judges and commentators in some doubt not only about 
the economic/noneconomic distinction’s meaning, but also about the 
distinction’s importance.65 The Court also noted the lack of any findings 
 
suggestion that this rationale would limit federal power over family law or 
education “devoid of substance”). 
63. See id. at 557 (warning against obliterating the distinction between what is 
national and what is local); Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: 
Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 Yale L.J. 619, 619–20 (2001) 
(defining categorical federalism); see also Daniel A. Farber, The 
Constitution’s Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the New Federalism and 
the Original Understanding, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 615, 625–26 (1995) 
(describing the state sovereignty claims as the heart of Lopez and its 
antecedents). 
64. See Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 540 F.3d 1242, 1251–52 (11th 
Cir. 2008) (suggesting that review of statutes regulating noneconomic 
activity “is significantly less deferential” under Lopez and Morrison); United 
States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 272 (3d Cir. 2000) (Weiss, J., dissenting) 
(reading Morrison as abandoning substantial deference under the rational 
basis test); Merritt, supra note 12, at 677 (claiming that Lopez reduces 
deference to Congress by creating a “toughened” rational basis standard); 
see also United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 151–52 (2000) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (suggesting that rational basis review under the Commerce 
Clause is less deferential than rational basis review under the Due Process 
Clause); cf. Jack M. Balkin, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 42 (2010) (criticizing the 
Lopez Court’s reliance on “traditional” areas of state regulation on the 
grounds that the federal government has long played a role in family law, 
education, and criminal law); Regan, supra note 54, at 566 (pointing out 
that every area of law is a traditional area of state concern “until the federal 
government takes an interest in it”). 
65. See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 125, 203 (characterizing the scope and nature of the limitation 
on regulation of noneconomic activity as “unclear”); see, e.g., Steven G. 
Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense 
of United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, 829 (1995) (stating that 
“we know” that Rehnquist’s opinion “does not make a distinction” based on 
economic activity); Pollak, supra note 52, at 551 (suggesting that the 
economic/noneconomic distinction would not “survive analysis” in future 
opinions and that Justices Kennedy and O’Connor probably see no merit in 
the distinction); H. Jefferson Powell, Enumerated Means and Unlimited Ends, 
94 Mich. L. Rev. 651, 651–52 (1995) (predicting that Lopez’s “main effect” 
would likely be “nothing more than a renewed congressional interest” in 
making findings). 
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linking gun possession to interstate commerce.66 Even though the Court 
acknowledged that its precedent does not require Congressional 
findings, some lower courts and commentators assumed that adequate 
findings would protect legislation from invalidation under Lopez.67 
Morrison largely dispelled any doubts about the economic/ 
noneconomic distinction’s importance, even though its treatment of the 
statute before it did nothing to clarify the distinction’s meaning and 
only marginally helped with gauging the distinction’s effect. Morrison 
expressly declares the noneconomic nature of gun possession “central” 
to the Lopez Court’s conclusion.68 The Morrison Court struck down the 
Violence Against Women Act, which created a private cause of action 
for victims of gender-based crimes, while declaring, in conclusory 
language very similar to that of Lopez, that gender-based crime is not 
an economic activity “in any sense of the phrase.”69 
As in Lopez, the Morrison Court did not squarely claim that its 
finding of noneconomic activity doomed the statute before it. Indeed, 
the Court clarified the law somewhat by stating that it was not creating 
a categorical rule against aggregating noneconomic activities to find an 
effect on interstate commerce.70 But the Court repeated its performance 
in Lopez by tacitly departing from robust rational basis review based 
on the inconsistency of rational basis review with categorical federalism, 
since the Violence Against Women Act regulated crime. Moreover, 
Morrison invalidated the Violence Against Women Act in spite of 
congressional findings linking gender-based crime to interstate 
commerce, reading Lopez as prohibiting following “attenuated” chains 
of causation.71 Thus, Morrison casts doubt on the significance of 
 
66. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562–63. 
67. See id. (noting that Congress is normally not required to make findings, but 
suggesting that they might be helpful); see, e.g., Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 
1375, 1418 (N.D. Iowa 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 
1998) (doubting the significance of noneconomic activities and reading Lopez 
as hinging on the lack of findings); Judi L. Lemos, Comment, The Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994: Connecting Gender-Motivated Violence to 
Interstate Commerce, 21 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1251, 1261 (1998) (reading 
Lopez as requiring Congressional findings). 
68. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (“[A] fair reading of 
Lopez shows that the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue 
was central to our decision in that case.”). 
69. Id. at 613. 
70. See id. (stating that “we need not adopt a categorical rule against 
aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity,” but noting that such 
aggregation would be without precedent). 
71. See id. at 614 (acknowledging “numerous findings regarding the serious 
impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims and their families” but 
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findings as a defense, suggesting that statutes regulating noneconomic 
activities traditionally regulated by states would receive stricter 
scrutiny than the rational basis test traditionally called for even when 
Congress documented apparently substantial effects on interstate 
commerce.72 
In Gonzalez v. Raich73—which upheld federal regulation of the 
cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for medical purposes—the 
Court suggested a definition of economic activity. It supported its 
conclusion that the Controlled Substances Act regulated 
“quintessentially economic” activities by pointing out that the diction-
ary defined economics as the “production, distribution, and consump-
tion of commodities.”74 This definition strongly suggests that cultiva-
tion and production of medical marijuana constitute economic activi-
ties, but seems to leave open the possibility that possession of mari-
juana, like possession of a gun, is not an economic activity. The Raich 
majority, however, seems to treat possession as an economic activity as 
well.75 
Justice Scalia, however, in a concurring opinion, distinguished 
simple possession from manufacture, distribution, and possession with 
intent to distribute, characterizing simple possession as noneconomic.76 
He found simple possession’s noneconomic status “immaterial,” since 
Congress may regulate noneconomic activity as part of a larger 
scheme.77 Scalia’s approach suggests that the actor’s intent may prove 
relevant to whether an activity qualifies as economic: possession with 
an intent to distribute constitutes an economic activity, whilst the same 
act without this intention does not. 
A few commentators have suggested that Raich makes the eco-
nomic activity concept irrelevant, because it defines economic activity 
 
finding the chain of causation linking gender-related crimes and interstate 
commerce “attenuated”). 
72. See Ides, supra note 9, at 566 (finding that the “non-economic 
characterization” of the activity in Morrison “played a significant role in the 
Court’s determination that a substantial relationship with interstate 
commerce was lacking”); cf. Shapiro & Buzbee, supra note 45, at 1223 
(describing Lopez and Morrison as establishing a “high, likely insuperable 
hurdle” for arguments that Congress may regulate noneconomic activity). 
73. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
74. Id. at 25. 
75. See id. (characterizing CSA-regulated activities as economic without 
qualification). 
76. See id. at 40. 
77. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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expansively.78 Even after Raich though, the lower courts have grappled 
with substantial questions about how to characterize regulated 
activities both in single subject statutes and broad schemes. And Raich 
itself divided the Court in part because the Justices differed about how 
to identify and characterize the regulated activities.79 
Although this Article has used the term “economic activity” con-
sistently for ease of exposition, the Morrison and Lopez decisions fre-
quently use the term “commercial activity” as a synonym.80 Raich, 
however, does not use those terms interchangeably. Indeed, it char-
acterizes the activity at issue in Wickard—growing wheat for home 
consumption—as noncommercial even though the Lopez Court had 
characterized this same activity as “economic.”81 Thus, Raich suggests 
that commercial activity constitutes a subset of economic activity, with 
the latter encompassing production, consumption, and distribution of 
commodities. Not much hinges on this distinction between economic 
and commercial activity at the moment, however, as Lopez and 
Morrison both suggest that regulation of economic activity (the broader 
of the two categories) still remains subject to deferential rational basis 
review.82 Accordingly, this Article will continue to refer to the 
 
78. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 48, at 844 (characterizing Raich as defining 
economic activity in such “sweepingly broad” terms as to confine Morrison 
and Lopez to their facts). 
79. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 48–49 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (focusing analysis 
only on the cultivation and possession of marijuana for medicinal use and 
questioning the characterization of these activities as economic). 
80. See United States v. McFarland, 311 F.3d 376, 396 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) 
(noting that Lopez and Morrison “appear to use the terms” commercial and 
economic activity “synonymously”). 
81. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 17–18 (discussing Wickard’s upholding of regulation 
of wheat grown for home consumption and concluding that Wickard 
establishes the validity of regulating noncommercial activity as part of a 
regulation of an interstate market); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
560 (1995) (stating that “Wickard . . . involved economic activity”). 
82. This conclusion about the irrelevance of the distinction between commercial 
and economic activity is not as clearly true for the Supreme Court as it is 
for lower courts. Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in Lopez 
characterizes Wickard as an outlier, even though the Court purported to 
follow it. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (describing Wickard as “perhaps the 
most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate 
activity”). Having now declared Wickard a case about noncommercial (albeit 
economic) activity, the Court might further limit the Commerce Clause by 
overruling Wickard in a future case. It could conceivably distinguish Wickard 
from the other cases by recategorizing the remaining cases as about 
commercial activity. The lower courts, however, cannot overrule and must 
follow Wickard. 
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economic/noneconomic distinction, even though large subsets of 
economic activities are also commercial activities. 
C. Scholars’ and Dissenting Justices’ Reaction to the 
Economic/Noneconomic Distinction 
Scholars agree that the Court has not provided any useful guidance 
on how to administer its economic/noneconomic distinction. Robert 
Shapiro and William Buzbee accuse the Court of “keep[ing] the cards 
face down” by giving “no indication” of how courts should identify the 
activity to be evaluated for commercial characteristics under the 
Commerce Clause.83 Lawrence Lessig characterizes Lopez as offering 
“nothing” to help distinguish commercial from noncommercial 
activity.84 Similarly, Christy Dral and Jerry J. Phillips accuse the Court 
of creating “unworkable standards” partly because it has not 
“sufficiently defined” the “economic requirement.”85 
Lopez and Morrison have defenders, but these defenders do not 
dispute the lack-of-guidance claim.86 Instead, they defend these cases 
simply on the ground that the doctrine of enumerated powers requires 
some limits on the Commerce Clause authority, and the notion that 
regulation of economic activity fits the Commerce Clause seems sen-
sible.87 
One might think that Raich has provided a sufficient resolution of 
the guidance problem, as it does seem to define economic activity as 
the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities. But 
scholars have recognized a closely related problem in figuring out what 
 
83. See Shapiro & Buzbee, supra note 45, at 1227–28. 
84. See Lessig, supra note 65, at 205. 
85. See Dral & Phillips, supra note 17, at 616–18. 
86. See Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual 
Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 
581, 604–05 (2010); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the 
Commerce Clause, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 101 (2001). 
87. See, e.g., Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw Jr., Rethinking the Commerce 
Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations 
but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 5–6 (1999) 
(approving the Lopez Court’s enforcement of Article I constraints but faulting 
the Court for providing no guide to identifying economic activity); see also 
Merrill, supra note 48, at 842 (characterizing the “economic activity 
limitation” as having “some connection to the language of the Constitution” 
but still rejecting Lopez); cf. Gil Seinfeld, The Possibility of Pretext Analysis 
in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1251, 1253–54 
(2003) (characterizing the economic/noneconomic distinction as “reviv[ing] a 
discredited approach” but explaining that some limits are necessary). 
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activity a statute regulates, which Raich does little to clarify.88 For 
example, one might characterize the Endangered Species Act (ESA) as 
regulating a species or as regulating construction (or any other type of 
activity) that harm critters.89 Viewed as a regulation of species, it is 
very hard to see the activities as economic. Under the Court’s definition, 
construction would seem to be an economic activity, as it is a form of 
production. But what if a person shoots an endangered critter, is that 
an economic activity?90 Furthermore, many statutes, such as the 
Controlled Substances Act analyzed in Raich and the ESA, regulate 
multiple activities, making identification of a single focus for analysis 
impossible without an arbitrary characterization decision.91 But the 
larger point is that a definition of economic activities does not solve the 
problem of how to characterize activities under a statute to identify a 
focal point (or foci) for analysis of activities’ economic nature. 
The dissenting Justices in Lopez analogized the economic/ 
noneconomic distinction to the older, formalist distinctions that the 
Court rejected in the 1930s.92 They criticized the distinction for creating 
legal uncertainty and demanding arbitrary line drawing.93 
Scholarly opinion, echoing the dissents, also generally finds the 
distinction normatively unsound.94 Since the Lopez Court affirms that 
 
88. See Dral & Phillips, supra note 17, at 618 (explaining that the Court has 
not explained “how courts define ‘economic’ or characterize the activity at 
issue”); John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands 
Flower-Loving Fly, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 174, 209 (1998) (discussing the “choice 
of activities problem”); Shapiro & Buzbee, supra note 45, at 1250 (finding 
identification of a constitutionally relevant single activity an unclear 
exercise). 
89. See Nagle, supra note 88, at 178 (stating that some D.C. Circuit judges in a 
leading case focused on the relationship between the protected species and 
commerce while others looked at the relationship between activities harming 
species and commerce). 
90. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 492–94 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
killing wolves to protect livestock constitutes an economic activity). 
91. See Lessig, supra note 65, at 204 (illustrating this problem with examples). 
92. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 608 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(likening the economic distinction to the distinction between direct and 
indirect effects); id. at 627–28 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (chiding the Court for 
making its decision hinge on a formalist distinction like those that outlawed 
statutes that have only indirect effects on commerce or regulate 
manufacturing). 
93. See id. at 628–30 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (claiming that the majority’s 
approach creates uncertainty and questioning the assumption that regulation 
of education must be regarded as regulating noneconomic activity). 
94. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Federalism’s “Old Deal”: What’s Right and 
Wrong with Conservative Judicial Activism, 45 Vill. L. Rev. 201, 220 
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it will uphold regulation of activities substantially affecting interstate 
commerce, it would seem that it must uphold regulation of any act-
ivities having such an effect, regardless of their nature.95 Furthermore, 
regulation of economic as well as noneconomic activity can displace 
traditional state regulation.96 So, it is not clear that the distinction 
tracks the Court’s categorical federalism concerns.97 
Shapiro and Buzbee articulate a broader thesis that illustrates the 
tenor, if not the exact specifics, of other critiques of the Court’s new 
formalist distinction. This Article also draws on their work in Part III 
to answer the question of how the Lopez guidance might inform our 
understanding of the Commerce Clause. 
Shapiro and Buzbee argue that the Rehnquist Court’s focus on re-
gulated activities unduly constricts the substantial-effects test. They 
suggest that instead of focusing solely on whether regulated activities 
substantially affect commerce, the Court should also consider whether 
a challenged law might benefit interstate commerce or otherwise affect 
commerce.98 In general, they criticize Lopez and Morrison for a uni-
dimensional approach to the assessment of a challenged law’s relation-
ship to commerce, focusing only on the law’s targets.99 Furthermore, 
they argue that even in identifying the regulatory target, the Court has 
 
(2000) (seeing no “plausible normative basis” for a distinction between 
commercial and noncommercial activity). 
95. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 657 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(questioning the idea that a noneconomic activity having the same effect as 
an economic activity on commerce should be treated differently); Dral & 
Phillips, supra note 17, at 618 (echoing Justice Breyer in contending that the 
Constitution authorizes regulation of all activities substantially affecting 
interstate commerce, whether economic or not); Pollak, supra note 52, at 547 
(noting the irrelevance of the characterization of the activity as economic to 
the question of whether regulated activity has a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce); Shane, supra note 94, at 220. 
96. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 628–29 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (pointing out that 
education, a traditional area of state regulation, might be thought of as a 
commercial activity); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 658 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the lack of congruence between noneconomic activity and areas 
of traditional state regulation); Shane, supra note 94, at 221 (observing that 
federal regulation of commercial activity “interfer[es] every bit as much in 
local police power as would federal regulation of . . . non-commercial 
activity”). 
97. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 14, at 116 (finding the “distinction between 
economic and noneconomic activity . . . mostly irrelevant to the problems of 
federalism”); Ides, supra note 9, 580–81 (finding that the Court’s true concern 
is with protecting “truly local” matters from federal regulation, not with 
preventing federal regulation of “noneconomic” activity). 
98. See Shapiro & Buzbee, supra note 45, at 1202. 
99. See id. at 1201–02. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 2·2016 
The Economic/Noneconomic Activity Distinction  
Under the Commerce Clause 
356 
permitted itself to strike down laws based on a single characterization 
of the target, even when multiple characterizations are plausible and 
appropriate.100 
Law and economics scholars find the economic/noneconomic dis-
tinction senseless. Reflecting economists’ understanding of economics as 
the science of rational choice, they consider practically all activity 
economic.101 Indeed, Alan Ides argues specifically that rape, the activity 
at the heart of Morrison, constitutes an economic activity.102 
On the other hand, a number of scholars recognize that the Court 
faces a dilemma in this area. On the one hand, a return to formalism 
through an economic/noneconomic distinction seems unattractive. On 
the other hand, the Commerce Clause must have some limits, and it 
did not have any judicially enforceable limits in the decades immedi-
ately preceding Lopez.103 
Donald Regan has therefore suggested a functional approach to 
finding limits—arguing that the Court should ask if there is some reason 
that the federal government must do what it does under a challenged 
statute rather than just leave the matter to the states.104 Following up 
on this suggestion, several scholars have proposed functional economic 
theories accepting either state collective action problems or market 
failures as justifications for regulation under the Commerce Clause.105 
These approaches would limit federal authority by authorizing the 
Court to strike down laws enacted in areas where no need for federal 
regulation existed. 
 
100. See id. at 1228 (claiming that the power to choose one characterization of 
an activity unleashes the Court’s discretion, while from 1937 to 1995 any 
plausible characterization would suffice). 
101. See, e.g., Ides, supra note 9, at 567 (referencing the rational-choice definition 
of economics, and stating that individuals maximize their self-interest and 
that “their activity in this regard is quintessentially economic”). 
102. See id. at 568 (characterizing rape as an economic activity because the 
rapist “maximizes his self-interest” and perceives rape’s benefits as out-
weighing its likely cost to him). 
103. See Dorf, supra note 14, at 2175 (characterizing the Court’s concern about 
granting Congress “a general police power” as “an understandable worry”); 
see also Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 43–44 (2010) 
(arguing that the Commerce Clause reaches only those problems that the 
states cannot handle on their own). 
104. See Regan, supra note 54, at 555 (suggesting that courts adjudicating 
Commerce Clause cases should ask if there is “some reason” that the federal 
government must act instead of leaving the matter to the states). 
105. See Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism and its Discontents, 91 Tex. 
L. Rev. 1937, 1938 (2013) (finding increasing support among scholars for the 
idea that the Commerce Clause is best read as solving collective-action 
problems); Cooter & Siegel, supra note 14; Lee, supra note 4. 
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Thus, many scholars find the distinction senseless. And all agree 
that Lopez and Morrison provide no guidance about its meaning. 
II. Lopez and Morrison’s Guidance  
on Economic Activity 
Lopez and Morrison, however, offer quite a few clues about how to 
apply the economic activity concept to statutes challenged under the 
Commerce Clause. These clues, however, appear in the midst of the 
Lopez Court’s effort to distinguish prior precedent, in the Lopez 
majority’s response to the dissent, and in Morrison’s structure, not in 
the Court’s application of the economic activity concept to the facts of 
the cases before it. 
A. Lopez’s Broad Conception of Economic Activity 
The Lopez Court employed the concept of “economic activity” as a 
device to distinguish prior precedent.106 The Court characterized all 
prior substantial effects cases upholding statutes as economic activity 
cases. Hence, every case in which the Court upheld a statute under the 
substantial effects test constitutes a source of guidance for how to define 
economic activity. Furthermore, the Lopez Court addressed the 
principal cases that seemed to pose a challenge to its effort to charac-
terize all prior precedent upholding statutes under the substantial 
effects test as regulating economic activity, thereby providing some 
guidance about activity characterization. 
This guidance, however, does not establish what many scholars may 
have in mind when they lament the lack of guidance—a clear guide to 
choosing a single characterization of a single activity. Rather, the 
plethora of examples shows a liberal approach to characterization of 
activities for purposes of economic activity analysis.107 In other words, 
it suggests that the Court will accept a plausible characterization of 
activities as economic within certain limits, even when another 
characterization casting them as noneconomic is equally plausible. 
The Court made clear, for example, that it accepts regulation of 
arguably noncommercial conduct as a regulation of economic activity, 
 
106. See Merrill, supra note 48, at 840 (characterizing the employment of the 
economic activity concept as a “sleight of hand” transforming a synthesis 
of prior case law into a “normative limitation”). 
107. See Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the 
Federalist Revival after Gonzalez v. Raich, 2005 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 25 
(describing the Court’s conception of commercial activity as “extremely 
capacious”). 
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when the regulated actors are commercial.108 Two of the most revealing 
cases in this regard, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States109 and 
Katzenbach v. McClung,110 involve challenges to the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (Civil Rights Act). As the dissent pointed out, these statutes 
might fairly be characterized as regulating an apparently noneconomic 
activity, racial discrimination.111 We might think of racial 
discrimination as a social practice, rather than an economic activity. 
The Lopez Court, however, characterized the Civil Rights Act as reg-
ulating hotels and restaurants.112 In other words, instead of character-
izing the activities in terms of the proscribed conduct, the Lopez Court 
focused on the nature of the actors regulated. The Civil Rights Act, in 
this view, regulates the activities of running hotels and restaurants by 
insisting that people operating these public accommodations serve all 
customers regardless of race. And the Court adopted this actor-centered 
approach even though the civil rights cases recognize that the Civil 
Rights Act’s purpose is to protect human dignity, which might be 
characterized as a noncommercial purpose.113 This approach is 
consistent with earlier cases upholding regulation for moral purposes 
under the Commerce Clause. Thus, Lopez characterizes the civil rights 
cases as regulating economic activities based on the character of the 
actors regulated. 
The Lopez Court employed a similar actor-centered approach to 
distinguish Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass’n, 
Inc.,114 which upheld the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 
of 1977 (Mining Act).115 One might characterize the Mining Act as 
 
108. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 656–57 (2000) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (recognizing that the Court accepts regulation of activities by 
economic actors). 
109. 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
110. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
111. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 628 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that the Civil Rights Act regulates noncommercial activity 
because it forbids “race-based exclusion”); Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. 
at 241–42 (describing the Civil Rights Act as forbidding racial 
discrimination in public accommodations); Regan, supra note 54, at 575 
(noting that Heart of Atlanta shows that Congress “may guarantee access 
and equal treatment of patrons”). 
112. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (characterizing McClung as about regulation of 
“restaurants using substantial interstate supplies” and Heart of Atlanta 
Motel as about regulation of hotels “catering to interstate guests”). 
113. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250 (describing the Civil 
Rights Act’s “fundamental object” as vindicating “personal dignity”). 
114. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
115. 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. III). 
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regulating the activity of pollution, defining the activity regulated in 
terms of the evil the statute seeks to address, something the Lopez 
dissent suggested.116 Or one might characterize the regulated activity 
as the major activity demanded by the statute, land restoration. These 
characterizations in terms of evils or remedies might make the activities 
appear non-economic.117 The Lopez Court, however, chose to 
characterize the Mining Act as regulating “intrastate coal mining,” 
which it characterized as an economic activity.118 The Court chose an 
actor-centered approach over focusing on the regulated evil or required 
remedies. 
The Lopez Court made it equally clear, however, that it accepts a 
statute not regulating legitimate economic actors as a regulation of 
economic activity, if it regulates transactions having an economic 
component. It did this by distinguishing Perez v. United States,119 which 
upheld a federal prohibition on loan sharking. The Lopez Court might 
have characterized the actors extorting money through loan sharking 
as economic actors, or alternatively as thugs. The Court might have 
characterized the activity in terms of the violence or threats that the 
statute aimed to prevent, rendering it perhaps noneconomic, as the 
Breyer dissent suggested.120 Instead, the Court focused on the regulated 
transactions rather than the regulated actors and viewed the 
transactions holistically by characterizing Perez as upholding the 
economic activity of “extortionate credit transactions.”121 Thus, Lopez 
accepts economic transactions as economic activity and defines 
economic transactions broadly. 
The Court also seems to accept production and consumption as 
economic activities, even when production and consumption do not lead 
to commercial transactions. The Lopez Court devoted most of its 
discussion of prior economic activity cases to distinguishing Wickard v. 
Filburn,122 characterizing “production and consumption of home grown 
wheat” as an economic activity.123 Lopez’s discussion of Wickard recites 
 
116. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 629 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (associating Hodel with 
the regulation of pollution). 
117. See generally Merrill, supra note 48, at 842 (suggesting that environmental 
statutes regulate pollution, a non-economic activity in his view). 
118. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276–280). 
119. 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
120. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 628 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the use of 
force in Perez was not “commercial”). 
121. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (citing Perez, 402 U.S. at 164). 
122. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
123. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559–61 (discussing Wickard). 
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Wickard’s facts and quotes from the opinion without explaining why 
the material recited supports the characterization of “production and 
consumption of home grown wheat” as economic activity. The recited 
facts establish that some of this homegrown wheat was sold.124 And the 
recited passage from the opinion shows that even the wheat consumed 
at home influenced the prices for wheat that the challenged statute 
sought to regulate.125 The Lopez opinion seems to reflect some 
ambivalence about accepting home consumption as an economic 
activity (why else mention that some of it was sold) but in the end it 
accepted that consumption is an economic activity.126 
At first glance, the Court’s opinion does not seem to establish any 
guidance, in spite of the discussion of all of this precedent. After all, 
the Court does not discuss the basis for the choices it has made in 
characterizing the activities in prior cases.127 Furthermore, the choices 
themselves are not consistent. In the civil rights and environmental 
cases, the Court employs an actor-centered approach, focusing on what 
sorts of entities the statutes regulate. In distinguishing Perez and 
Wickard, however, the Court does not focus on the actor so much as 
on the statutory prohibitions and the precise actions to which they 
apply. 
By accepting all of the prior case law as a source of guidance, 
however, the Court accepted the idea that activities that might be 
considered economic under any of the conceptions implicit in prior cases 
constitutes economic activity. Statutes regulating economic trans-
actions or economic actors, therefore, regulate economic activities. 
The Lopez majority opinion signals the breadth of its conception of 
economic activities by characterizing the statute before it as having 
“nothing to do with . . . any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly 
one might define [that] term[].”128 It also states that gun possession in 
a school zone “is in no sense an economic activity.”129 And the Court 
echoes these statements in Morrison, stating that gender-related crimes 
 
124. See id. at 560. 
125. See id. (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128). 
126. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559–60 (describing Wickard as about consumption 
and production of homegrown wheat); see also U.S. v. Jeronimo–Bautista, 
425 F.3d 1266, 1271–73 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding that production of child 
pornography constitutes an economic activity even when it is not intended 
for sale under Wickard and Raich). 
127. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559–60 (setting out its characterization of prior 
cases’ regulated activities in parentheticals). 
128. Id. at 561 (emphasis added). 
129. Id. at 567 (emphasis added).  
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are not economic “in any sense of the phrase.”130 These statements 
suggest that activity that is in some sense an economic activity should 
be treated as such, even if competing plausible characterizations suggest 
that it is not an economic activity. 
Furthermore, this broad conception of economic activity, accepting, 
at a minimum, regulation of all economic actors and all economic 
transactions, was clearly essential to obtaining Justices Kennedy and 
O’Connor’s votes, which were needed to form a majority in Lopez. The 
two Justices concurred because the majority opinion’s broad approach 
to the characterization of activities as economic justified the result in 
Lopez without, in their view, violating stare decisis.131 
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor expressed great concern for stare 
decisis.132 And they identified that concern with the need to honor the 
“practical conception of the commerce power” found in cases beginning 
in the late New Deal.133 They accepted the majority opinion because it 
employed a broad concept of economic activity, which the concurrence 
refers to as “the Court’s practical conception of commercial 
regulation.”134 The majority opinion’s concept of economic activity, in 
their view, comports with stare decisis, because it is broad enough not 
to “call[] into question” Heart of Atlanta Motel, Katzenbach, Perez, and 
the rest of the modern precedent.135 Thus, acceptance of all of the 
implicit conceptions of economic activity in prior cases was essential to 
their vote. 
The concurrence finds the Lopez result acceptable only because 
under the GFSZA “neither the actors nor their conduct has a com-
mercial character.”136 Thus, a statute regulating either commercial 
actors or commercial conduct would regulate economic activity. This 
broad understanding of economic activity is essential to the concurr-
ence’s finding Lopez consistent with prior precedent. 
This reading of Lopez as embracing a liberal understanding of eco-
nomic activity has the virtue of resolving gross contradictions within 
Lopez. Lopez tells us in one breath that gun possession in school zones 
“is in no sense an economic activity” no matter how “broadly one might 
 
130. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (emphasis added). 
131. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 573–74 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
132. See id. at 574 (noting the legal system’s “immense stake in the stability of 
our Commerce Clause jurisprudence” and stating that “[s]tare decisis 
operates with great force” in this area). 
133. See id. at 572. 
134. Id. at 574. 
135. See id. at 573–74. 
136. See id. at 580 (emphasis added). 
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define” economic enterprise.137 In the next, it acknowledges that “any 
activity can be looked upon as commercial.”138 Well, if gun possession 
“can be looked upon as commercial,” then it is an economic activity in 
some sense. Thus, the statements in Lopez (and Morrison) 
characterizing the activities before the Court as not conceivably eco-
nomic cannot be taken literally.139 These statements must be read, in-
stead, as signaling a very broad meaning of economic activity consistent 
with all prior precedent.140 Otherwise, the statements that characterize 
the activities before the Court as “in no sense economic” flatly 
contradict the Court’s acknowledgment that all activities can, in some 
sense, be regarded as economic. 
This reading also resolves a problem that Justice Breyer flagged—
that the Court’s characterization of gun possession as a noneconomic 
activity cannot be reconciled with the civil rights cases.141 Justice 
Breyer points out that the majority’s ruling, in effect, identifies the 
regulated activity as the prohibited conduct, gun possession.142 If con-
duct prescription limits the available characterizations of regulated 
activities, the civil rights cases must be characterized as cases about 
the regulation of racial discrimination, which looks like a noneconomic 
activity, and Lopez becomes arguably inconsistent with the civil rights 
cases. Accepting a reading of Lopez that allows regulation of either 
economic actors or economic transactions, however, resolves this con-
tradiction. Such a reading is consistent with the civil rights cases, since 
the activities regulated can fairly be described as the majority does (as 
regulation of hotels and restaurants) or in the terms suggested by the 
dissent (as regulation of racial discrimination). Since the GFSZA 
exempts gun possession by paid guards from its prohibition, the 
majority’s statements saying that the activities regulated under that 
Act were not economic in any sense can be read as signaling that the 
Act focused on noncommercial actors as well as noncommercial 
 
137. See id. at 561, 567 (stating that the Act “has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ 
or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those 
terms” and that gun possession is “in no sense an economic activity”); see also 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (declaring that gender-
motivated crimes are not economic activity “in any sense of the phrase”). 
138. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565. 
139. See Ides, supra note 9, at 567 (characterizing this claim as an 
“overstatement”). 
140. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565 (rejecting Justice Breyer’s argument that schools 
can be looked upon as commercial because it “lacks . . . limits”). 
141. See id. at 628 (stating that economic activity cannot be defined solely in 
terms of gun possession itself, because this conflicts with the civil rights 
cases). 
142. See id. 
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transactions. In other words, the only way of reconciling Lopez with the 
civil rights cases (and for that matter the various statements in the 
majority opinion with each other) is to accept that a statute is valid if 
it regulates either economic activities or economic actors. 
B. Limits on the Economic Activity Concept 
The Lopez majority’s response to Justice Breyer’s dissent, however, 
does suggest some limits to the Court’s conception of economic 
regulation. Specifically, this response suggests that an activity that has 
nothing to do with consumption, production, or sales cannot become 
economic simply because it has an effect, even a very substantial effect, 
on commerce.143 Justice Breyer suggests that gun possession near 
schools can be thought of as a commercial activity, in part because the 
threat of gun violence can impede learning necessary to create a 
productive work force.144 He also squarely argues that education can be 
thought of as an economic activity because it trains the nation’s 
workforce.145 The majority rejects looking at gun possession or 
education’s effects on commerce in determining whether gun possession 
or education is commercial activity.146 The majority’s concession that 
“any activity can be looked upon as commercial” appears as part of its 
response to Justice Breyer’s attempt to bring practical effects into the 
analysis of economic activity.147 And its insistence that the concept of 
 
143. Compare id. at 559–61 (creating the economic/noneconomic distinction and 
declaring gun possession noneconomic) and United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (finding “[g]ender-motivated crime” noneconomic) with 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563–65 (analyzing the question of whether gun possession 
substantially affects interstate commerce); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615–619 
(rejecting the argument that the law should be upheld because the regulated 
activity substantially affects interstate commerce); see also United States 
v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 270 (3rd Cir. 2000) (Weiss, J., dissenting) (reading 
Morrison and Lopez as requiring that the regulated “conduct itself” 
determine the nature of activities without reference to such “external factors 
as financial effects”). 
144. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 620 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that “gun-
related violence” in school zones is “a commercial . . . problem” because it 
disrupts education, which has a “direct economic link” to “industrial 
productivity”). 
145. See id. at 628–30 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that education can be 
viewed as a commercial activity because it trains a skilled workforce). 
146. See id. at 565 (Rehnquist, J.) (rejecting using a chain of causation linking 
gun possession disrupting education to negative effects on commerce as a 
way of deciding whether education or child rearing constitute commercial 
activities). 
147. See id. (complaining that Justice Breyer’s chain of causation rationale 
“lacks any real limits because, depending on the level of generality, any 
activity can be looked upon as commercial”). 
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commercial activity must have some limits is best read as an insistence 
that the concept of commercial or economic activity not include an 
assessment of economic effects. 
The structure of the Court’s Morrison opinion confirms economic 
effect’s irrelevance to the characterization of activities as commercial or 
non-commercial. Morrison begins with a determination of whether 
regulated activity is economic.148 It continues with a separate analysis 
of whether the activity substantially affects interstate commerce.149 
Morrison’s summary of Lopez also separates the characterization of 
activity from the evaluation of effects on commerce.150 
Furthermore, the role of a finding of noneconomic activity seems to 
involve biasing the analysis against finding a substantial effect. It would 
be circular to bring the question of whether a substantial effect exists 
into the determination of which activities are economic.151 And the 
Supreme Court has, for the most part, avoided that approach.152 
III. Implications 
This Part examines the implications of the existence of meaningful 
guidance in Lopez. Its first Section will look at the question of whether 
sources outside of the Supreme Court’s Lopez opinion undermine this 
interpretation. If they do, then this guidance may not help much. The 
second Section looks at whether the existence of the guidance has any 
implications for criticisms of the distinction. The third Section offers 
some analysis of this guidance’s capacity to resolve the uncertainties 
that the economic activities concept has spawned. 
A. Challenges to the Broad Interpretation 
The analysis presented above reconciles the Court’s treatment of 
the GFSZA and its treatment of prior precedent by emphasizing that 
 
148. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (finding “[g]ender-motivated crime” noneconomic). 
149. Id. at 615–19 (rejecting the argument that the law should be upheld 
because the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce). 
150. Id. at 610–12 (employing a four-part framework beginning with characteri-
zation and ending with effects to summarize Lopez); cf. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
559–61, 563–65 (following the structure described but returning to the 
activity characterization in the midst of analyzing effects to rebut Justice 
Breyer). 
151. Cf. Seinfeld, supra note 87, at 1287 (portraying the substantial effects test 
as providing a functional view of federalism at war with a formalist 
distinction between economic and noneconomic activities). 
152. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610–12 (treating Lopez as having a four-part 
structure beginning with its findings about economic activity and ending 
with an application of the substantial effects test). 
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the former regulated neither economic transactions nor economic actors 
whilst the latter regulated one or the other. Some have argued for a 
narrower conception of economic activities focused on economic trans-
actions alone based on the premises that Lopez himself was an economic 
actor.153 They read Lopez as demanding that conduct prescriptions 
delineate the definition of regulated activities. 
The view that Lopez was an economic actor arises from the fact 
that somebody paid Lopez to deliver the gun to a gang member.154 This 
fact, however, appears nowhere in the Supreme Court opinion, even 
though the opinion below does mention it.155 So speculation about what 
this fact implies cannot supersede explicit statements approving of 
regulation of economic actors in the Supreme Court’s Lopez opinion. 
There are several possible explanations for why neither the majority 
nor the dissent mentioned this fact. 
 Since the Court adjudicates the validity of any statute under 
the Commerce Clause with reference to the entire class of activities 
regulated, not with reference to the particular case before the Court, 
Lopez’s particular situation might have seemed irrelevant. Absent some 
showing that a substantial portion of those carrying guns in school 
zones received payment for doing so, this fact would not matter.156 
Lopez’s receipt of cash does raise an issue worthy of more attention: 
statutes regulating a richer mix of economic and noneconomic activities 
may pose great analytical challenges. But there seems to be no reason 
to assume that a substantial portion of those carrying guns illegally in 
school zones receive payment under a statute that legalizes gun 
 
153. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Petitioners at 6–7, GDF Realty Investments, LTD. 
v. Norton, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005) (No. 03-1619), denying cert. to 326 F.3d 622 
(5th Cir. 2003), 2004 WL 2092631 (arguing that motive should be irrelevant 
to determining commercial activities since the violation in Lopez itself was 
carried out for economic reasons—the $40 payment); Jonathan H. Adler, 
The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental Challenge to Federalism, 9 Sup. 
Ct. Econ. Rev. 205, 240 & n.162 (2001) (citing the payment to Lopez to 
narrow the conception of economic activity). 
154. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), aff’d, 514 U.S. 
549 (1995) (stating that somebody paid Lopez $40 to deliver a gun to a 
person who planned to use it in a gang war). 
155. See id. 
156. Cf. Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead?: Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) 
Overdose, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 751, 772 (2005) (arguing that Lopez 
was engaged in a commercial transaction so that an as-applied challenge to 
the GFSZA, if allowed, might have failed). 
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possession in school zones for the obvious recipients of payments 
(security guards and police).157 
Another possibility is that the Court’s conception of an economic 
transaction reaches only legitimate economic transactions, not criminal 
conduct. Morrison suggests as much by identifying the “noneconomic, 
criminal nature of the conduct at issue” in Lopez as central to its Lopez 
decision.158 Yet, at the same time, the Lopez Court approved of Perez, 
which poses a challenge for the idea that only legitimate commercial 
activity counts, as it upheld federal regulation of extortion. Perhaps the 
best way of reconciling these apparently conflicting statements would 
be to assume that courts should treat regulation of organized crime as 
regulation of an economic activity, but not regulation of general crimes 
that sometimes have economic motives. 
In any event, speculation about the significance of a fact omitted 
from a Supreme Court opinion cannot defeat its rationale. Nor, for that 
matter, can this fact undermine all of the previous precedent that Lopez 
left in place, which now rests on a broad concept of economic activity. 
Accordingly, the unacknowledged facts surrounding Lopez’s arrest do 
not pose a serious challenge to the broad definition of economic activity 
offered above. They do, however, reveal that this guidance certainly 
does not resolve all issues of how to apply the economic activity concept 
to federal criminal statutes.159 
Subsequent Supreme Court cases likewise do not fundamentally 
challenge the guidance derived above from Lopez, but do raise questions 
about how well the guidance functions in narrowing the realm of 
uncertainty emanating from the economic activity concept. The Su-
preme Court’s decision in Solid Waste Agency of North Cook County 
v. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC)160 made statements in some 
tension with the broad concept outlined above, but did so in dicta that 
cannot displace Lopez’s rationale or prior precedent’s implications. In 
SWANCC, the Court held that the terms establishing the Clean Water 
Act’s jurisdictional limits do not authorize federal jurisdiction over sand 
 
157. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(ii), (v)–(vi) (2012) (exempting people under 
contract with a school, law enforcement personnel, and qualified licensees 
generally). 
158. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (emphasis added). 
159. See, e.g., U.S. v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1122, 1138 (9th Cir. 2003) (the 
majority characterizing the regulation of child pornography as noneconomic 
because it focused on the defendant’s conduct and the dissent characterizing 
it as economic because it focused on the class of activities regulated); United 
States v. McFarland, 311 F.3d 376, 395 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) 
(disagreeing with some “sister circuits” as to whether robbery is an economic 
activity). 
160. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
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and gravel pits providing habitat for migratory birds.161 The case 
resolved an ordinary statutory issue, but did not reach the appellant’s 
Commerce Clause claim.162 The Court, however, made statements that 
raise questions about its willingness to follow its precedent. The 
SWANCC Court acknowledged the characterization problem that 
Lopez created, stating that if it were to resolve the Commerce Clause 
claim it would have to figure out how to describe the relevant regulated 
activity.163 Commenting on the government’s argument that the 
municipal landfill that the EPA regulated in order to protect migratory 
bird habitat is “plainly of a commercial nature,” the Court responded 
that this characterization “is a far cry, indeed, from the ‘navigable 
waters’ and ‘waters of the United States’ to which the statute by its 
terms extends.”164 This response’s focus on a single statutory provision 
suggests a formalism quite at odds with the Lopez Court’s treatment of 
precedent, which the Lopez concurrence relied upon in finding the 
majority opinion consistent with a broad functional approach to the 
Commerce Clause. And the suggestion that an appropriate analysis 
under the substantial effects test might focus on the waters to be 
protected, rather than on the activities to be regulated, seems 
completely at odds with the Lopez Court’s approach to cabining the 
Commerce Clause by formally restricting it to three defined categories 
of cases.165 The Lopez decision, for all of its myriad inconsistencies, 
clearly treats the human activities that a statute modifies or restricts 
as the regulated activity, not the resources that it might protect. 
Because this statement is dictum it cannot supersede Lopez’s call 
to focus on regulated activity or its endorsement of a broad approach 
to characterizing that activity. But it raises troubling questions, to be 
addressed below, about whether Lopez’s guidance will channel future 
decisions.166 
 
161. See id. at 162, 174 (explaining the statutory issue as about jurisdiction over 
a sand and gravel pit and concluding that the Migratory Bird Rule as applied 
to that site exceeds the Army Corps of Engineer’s statutory authority under 
the Clean Water Act). 
162. See id. at 162 (stating that the Court “do[es] not reach” the Commerce 
Clause claim). 
163. See id. at 173. 
164. Id. 
165. Cf. Merrill, supra note 48, at 841–42 (explaining that Lopez’s summary of 
Wickard seems to conflate economic effect with economic activity, but that 
the Court ultimately focused on economic activity, not economic effect). 
166. Cf. id. at 842–43 (assuming that the Clean Water Act regulates migratory 
birds). The Clean Water Act, of course, does not issue instructions to 
migratory birds. Instead, it regulates human activities that harm migratory 
bird habitat. The fact that a very thoughtful scholar and the Supreme Court, 
albeit in ill-considered dicta, suggested a characterization of economic activity 
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B. The Guidance’s Theoretical Significance 
The guidance found in Lopez suggests some qualification of the 
unidimensional federalism critique that Shapiro and Buzbee offer. In 
particular, Lopez takes a multidimensional approach to the characteri-
zation of activities as economic or noneconomic. The best reading of 
Lopez does not give courts license to reject a regulation of an economic 
actor based on the fact that the statutory prescription may regulate a 
noncommercial aspect of the actor’s conduct. Conversely, Lopez does 
not permit courts to reject regulation restricting commercial 
transactions engaged in by noncommercial actors. Lopez is, at least to 
that extent, multidimensional. 
Some other pieces of Shapiro and Buzbee’s critique remain valid, 
however, but these problems may prove less important than Shapiro 
and Buzbee think. For example, they criticize the Court’s sole focus on 
regulatory targets, which neglects effects on regulatory beneficiaries as 
a basis for Commerce Clause validity. But one can convert effects on 
regulatory targets into Commerce Clause arguments based on 
regulatory benefits fairly easily.167 It remains important to recognize 
this, because courts and lawyers have tripped themselves up over this 
matter. 
Take the ESA. Some courts and lawyers have attempted to defend 
the ESA’s constitutionality by examining the benefits that the ESA 
generates.168 Framed in terms of statutory benefits, this argument about 
meeting the substantial effects test seems like an impermissible 
argument under Lopez. It may well be that saving endangered plants 
and animals (and their habitats) benefits interstate commerce by 
conserving genetic material that might prove useful in making products, 
promoting tourism, or providing ecosystem services to the economy. 
But why should that matter under Lopez’s substantial effects test? The 
ESA does not regulate the conduct of plants and animals; it protects 
them. So this argument about a statute’s benefits seems like an 
argument that seeks to undo the cabining that Lopez put in place in 
order to put some limits on the power of the federal government under 
the Commerce Clause. This simply is not an argument about regulated 
 
demonstrably at odds with Lopez suggests that lower courts will likewise find 
it difficult to distinguish regulated activities from a regulation’s beneficiaries. 
167. See, e.g., Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 540 F.3d 1242, 1250 
(11th Cir. 2008) (finding the question of whether a law eliminating tort 
liability for rental car companies regulates commercial leasing or state torts 
insignificant, as in either case it relieves car rental companies of burdens). 
168. See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Property Owners (PETPO) v. 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 57 F. Supp. 3d 1337, 1344 (2014) (addressing a 
government argument that a rule affects interstate commerce, not framed in 
terms of regulated activities affecting interstate commerce). 
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activities’ effects on commerce; it is an argument about a statute’s 
effects on commerce. Accordingly, several judges have rejected such 
arguments.169 
Yet, lawyers can make functionally identical arguments by framing 
them in terms of the activities regulated. The ESA regulates economic 
actors (like mining companies, timber companies, and farming) when 
their activities kill endangered species (usually by harming their 
habitat). These activities can cause species to perish, thereby harming 
commerce by destroying the useful genetic material, tourism, and eco-
system services that stem from the existence of the protected creatures 
and their habitats. Hence, the argument would continue, the ESA 
constitutes a permissible regulation of economic activity, which has a 
substantial effect on commerce. This argument that the Act regulates 
activities affecting interstate commerce, while functionally identical to 
the argument that the Act affects interstate commerce by protecting 
species, formally lies comfortably within the substantial effects test as 
defined by Lopez.170 
This type of reframing does not evade Lopez. The Lopez Court itself 
identified its articulation of a substantial effects test focused on 
regulated activities as a way of implementing prior decisions permitting 
regulation “where ‘a general regulatory statute bears a substantial 
relation to commerce.’”171 
The unidimensional federalism critique flags the possibility that 
Lopez unleashes judicial discretion to invalidate Acts of Congress based 
on manipulation of formal categories. The comments made above show 
that Lopez requires a great deal of multidimensionality, thereby 
formally at least preventing many of the unfortunate outcomes that 
concern Shapiro and Buzbee. The question of whether judges will follow 
this guidance and judges and other lawyers will skillfully navigate the 
formal requirements receives more attention below. The unidimensional 
federalism thesis may well identify traps for the unwary, even if it does 
not identify strong doctrinal impediments to reaching appropriate 
results. 
Although this analysis shows that the Lopez guidance does have 
implications for Commerce Clause theory, I do not want to claim too 
much on the normative front. The guidance does not address some more 
 
169. See, e.g., id. at 1344 (rejecting an argument that a rule under the ESA has 
a substantial effect on commerce, because the argument does not focus on 
regulated activities). 
170. Cf. id. at 1345 (converting an argument framed in terms of the protected 
prairie dog’s effect on interstate commerce into an argument about 
regulated activities’ effects on interstate commerce, but rejecting the 
argument as too “tenuous”). 
171. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (emphasis added by the 
Lopez Court) (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968)). 
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fundamental arguments raised by the dissenters and their supporting 
commentators. Even if one could show that this guidance eliminates all 
substantial ambiguity about application of the economic/noneconomic 
distinction (which is a stretch to say the least), this would not signifi-
cantly improve its formal fit with the substantial effects test. That is, 
if the test accepts Congressional regulation of activities substantially 
affecting interstate commerce, why should it matter that a set of regu-
lated activities having that effect are noneconomic? Even an airtight 
economic/noneconomic distinction does not answer that question. 
Nor does the guidance answer the question of whether or not the 
economic/noneconomic distinction makes more or less sense than some 
of the functionalist theories put forward as a way of cabining the 
Commerce Clause authority, although it may color some aspects of that 
question. The functional theories call for a judicial judgment about 
whether a federal role in a particular matter is needed based on 
collective action or market failure. This judgment entails a rather am-
bitious judicial role in making more or less political judgments. The 
debate about functionalism has focused on the constitutional justifi-
cation for the inquiry and its soundness in principle. So far, scholars 
have paid little attention to the question of whether a new functional 
approach will reduce the amount of uncertainty that the economic/ 
noneconomic distinction has spawned. The existence of some guidance 
on the concept of economic activity should play a role in assessing that 
question. 
Similarly, the existence of this guidance might influence the ongoing 
debate about whether the federal courts should define the limits of the 
Commerce Clause’s reach or instead leave that task to the political 
process.172 If uncertainty persists in spite of the guidance, that would 
strengthen the case for judicial modesty. Conversely, if the guidance 
makes uncertainty negligible that would strengthen the case for 
allowing some continuation of the new judicial activism in this realm. 
C. Resolving Uncertainty 
This Section addresses the question of whether Lopez’s guidance 
substantially limits the uncertainty that the distinction has spawned. 
To start on a note of optimism, Lopez has not sparked a wave of lower 
court rulings striking down statutes because of a failure to appreciate 
the breadth of Lopez’s conception of economic activity.173 This might 
 
172. See Strauss, supra note 38, at 3–4 (pointing out that the Court has leapt 
from the premise that the Constitution imposes limits to the conclusion that  
the courts must enforce them in spite of the failure of previous efforts to do 
so in the Commerce Clause context). 
173. See Brannon P. Denning, United States v. Lopez (1995) and its Progeny: About-
Face, Detour, or Misstep?, in Bittker on Regulation Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce § 5.04(I) (2nd ed., Aspen Publishers 2016) (stating that 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 2·2016 
The Economic/Noneconomic Activity Distinction  
Under the Commerce Clause 
371 
suggest that in practice the lower courts and the lawyers who argue 
cases before them have assimilated Lopez’s guidance and employed a 
sufficiently broad conception of commercial activity to justify upholding 
a lot of statutes. If so, this Article may strengthen the trend by making 
the guidance’s existence and content explicit. 
According to the Fifth Circuit, a number of federal courts have 
recognized the breadth of the economic activity concept articulated in 
Lopez.174 The case mentioning this pattern went on to uphold a federal 
statute requiring reasonable accommodation of the disabled in the sale 
or lease of housing based on both the economic character of the regu-
lated transactions and the economic character of the actors before the 
Court, in keeping with the Lopez guidance.175 
The lower court rulings suggest some learning about Lopez’s gui-
dance over time. For example, shortly after the Supreme Court decided 
Lopez, the D.C. Circuit upheld the ESA’s application to the Delhi Sands 
Flower-Loving Fly in a divided opinion reflecting confusion about the 
application of the economic activity concept.176 Judge Wald suggested 
that the ESA regulates the activity of taking species, a non-economic 
activity.177 She nevertheless concluded that the statute passes muster 
because it has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.178 In a 
concurring opinion, Judge Henderson characterized the activity regu-
lated as the commercial development that the statute restricts, a com-
mercial activity.179 Judge Sentelle, in dissent, characterized the activity 
regulated more narrowly, as the “killing of flies,” which he viewed as 
noncommercial.180 This confusion suggests that Lopez’s treatment of 
 
“lower courts have not invalidated [federal] statutes en masse” in the wake of 
Lopez and Morrison). 
174. See Groome Res. Ltd., L.L.C. v. Par. of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 208–09 
(5th Cir. 2000) (referring to other courts’ “broad reading” of the economic 
activity concept and giving numerous examples). 
175. See id. at 206 (describing the Act as regulating the purchase, sale, or rental 
of housing and identifying these transactions as “commercial” and the 
plaintiff as a “commercial actor”). 
176. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
177. See id. at 1049 (characterizing the activity regulated as the taking of 
species and suggesting that this activity is not commercial). 
178. See id. at 1052 (finding that the ESA affects interstate commerce by 
protecting biodiversity and related commerce by regulating a byproduct of 
interstate competition). 
179. See id. at 1058. 
180. See id. at 1061, 1064 (characterizing the question before the Court as 
whether Congress may regulate the “killing of flies” and finding that activity 
noncommercial). 
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economic activity initially confounded the judges sitting on the second 
most powerful court in the country. 
But when the D.C. Circuit revisited the question of the ESA’s 
constitutionality in a post-Morrison case challenging protection of the 
arroyo toad, it showed considerably less confusion about identifying 
regulated activities. The court unanimously adopted the views of Judge 
Henderson, characterized the case before it as about regulation of a 
“commercial housing development,” the activity threatening the arroyo 
toad.181 It specifically rejected the idea that the ESA regulates the 
arroyo toad, commenting that the “ESA does not purport to tell toads 
what they may or may not do.”182 
More importantly than the particular result reached, the court 
embraced this economic activity characterization based on at least some 
appreciation of the guidance Lopez offered. In particular, it 
characterized Lopez and Morrison as about “purely” noneconomic 
activity.183 And it quoted language from Morrison emphasizing that 
regulation of commercial actors or commercial transactions count as 
economic activities.184 By adopting a concept of “pure” noneconomic 
activity, the D.C. Circuit recognized that Lopez does not permit the 
manipulation of the economic activity category based on the existence 
of some noneconomic regulatory targets or some ways of characterizing 
activities sensibly viewed as economic as noneconomic. Indeed, the 
court notes that the ESA seeks “in part” to regulate “economic growth 
and development,” thereby suggesting that the existence of 
noneconomic regulatory targets would not justify striking down a sta-
tute when it also regulates a substantial amount of economic activity.185 
 
181. See Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1069, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (majority and concurring opinions) (identifying the “regulated 
activity” as “a 202 acre commercial housing development”). 
182. Id. at 1072. 
183. See id. 
184. See id. (noting that “Morrison describes Lopez as a case in which ‘neither the 
actors nor their conduct ha[d] a commercial character’” (quoting United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (1999)) (brackets in original)). 
185. See id. at 1072–73 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1)); cf. U.S. v. Gilbert, 677 
F.3d 613, 624–25 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that a federal prohibition on animal 
fighting regulates an economic activity in light of evidence showing that such 
fights often are staged to encourage betting, admission fees, and payments 
from those providing animals); San Luis Water Auth. v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 
1163, 1176 (9th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that the ESA “implicates economic 
concerns” because it prevents “overutilization” of species for commercial 
purposes and prohibits commerce in protected species); Alabama-Tombigbee 
Rivers Coal v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250, 1273 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(mentioning the ESA’s prohibition on commerce in endangered species); see 
also U.S. v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 480 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding prohibition of 
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Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has recognized that the economic 
activity concept “must be understood in broad terms.”186 Accordingly, 
ranchers’ wolf-killing primarily to protect “commercially valuable live-
stock and crops” constitutes an economic activity for the purpose of 
analyzing the ESA’s constitutionality under the Commerce Clause as 
applied to restrictions protecting red wolves.187 
Some courts have explicitly recognized the limits found in Lopez’s 
guidance as well. In analyzing the difficult question of whether robbery 
constitutes an economic activity under Lopez, the Fifth Circuit 
recognized that the fact that robbery has an economic effect cannot be 
dispositive.188 In doing so, it explicitly recognized that Lopez (and 
Morrison) do not allow consideration of effects to enter into activity 
characterization.189 
Some courts, however, show little understanding of the Lopez gui-
dance. Thus, the Fifth Circuit, in a disjointed opinion, declined to 
consider the commercial nature of the activities taking species in seek-
ing to implement the economic/noneconomic distinction.190 Its opinion 
reveals quite a bit of confusion regarding how to apply the Lopez gui-
dance.191  
 
possession of child pornography, even though some possessors engage in non-
commercial activity rather than purchase or sell child pornography). 
186. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 491 (4th Cir. 2000). 
187. See id. at 492 (characterizing taking red wolves as economic activity because 
a desire to protect commercially valuable assets motivates the killings). 
188. United States v. McFarland, 311 F.3d 376, 396–97 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) 
(concluding that robbery is not a commercial activity even though it has an 
“economic effect”). 
189. See id. at 397 (recognizing that considering economic effects in deciding 
whether robbery is an economic activity would support “making a federal 
offense of any crime,” which is inconsistent with Lopez and Morrison); cf. 
United States v. Gray, 260 F.3d 1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
robbery constitutes an economic activity because it involuntarily transfers 
assets). 
190. See GDF Realty Inv., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 633–36 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(stating that application of the ESA to a commercial development should 
not be considered an economic activity). 
191. The Fifth Circuit seemed to recognize that either commercial actors or 
commercial transactions would justify a classification of an activity as 
economic. See id. at 634 (citing indirectly the statements in Lopez and 
Morrison that neither the actors nor the transactions in those cases were 
commercial). Yet, the GDF Realty Court took a senseless formalistic 
approach to applying that teaching to the facts before it, declaring that the 
ESA does not “directly” regulate “commercial development.” See id. It thus 
attempted to distinguish regulated takings from commercial activity. Such a 
division is untenable and completely inconsistent with Lopez’s treatment of 
prior precedent. The litigation in GDF Realty stemmed from a denial of a 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 2·2016 
The Economic/Noneconomic Activity Distinction  
Under the Commerce Clause 
374 
Furthermore, in some cases, the Lopez guidance, even as supple-
mented by Raich, fails to resolve critical ambiguities in the concept of 
economic activities. For example, courts adjudicating the validity of the 
Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA) have tacitly followed the liberal 
Lopez guidance by viewing it as a regulation of a financial obligation, 
even though it could be viewed as a regulation of parenting—a non-
economic activity under Lopez and Morrison.192 One might think it 
obvious that payment of money constitutes a financial transaction and, 
therefore, an economic activity under Lopez.193 But child support 
constitutes a transfer of wealth, not squarely fitting the conception that 
Raich suggested.194 This ambiguity may help explain why many courts 
have upheld the CSRA as a regulation of an instrumentality of 
commerce with little reliance on the substantial effects test.195 
 
permit for commercial development. See id. at 626–627 (discussing the 
history of permit denials). The Fish and Wildlife Service refused to issue 
permits because the commercial development would take a protected species. 
Id. Hence, the take and the commercial development were one and the same. 
Furthermore, it is impossible to reconcile this formalism with Lopez’s 
treatment of the civil rights cases and Perez. The GDF Realty Court also 
struggled with the difference between activity characterization and the 
evaluation of effects on commerce. Its opinion meanders between the two 
issues. Id. at 630–36 (noting several times the centrality of deciding whether 
activity is commercial, but discussing effects on commerce repeatedly 
before finally deciding that the activity before it is not commercial). And it 
treats the ESA as not regulating commercial activity, because it only has the 
“effect” of prohibiting commercial development in some circumstances. See id. 
at 634. But when a statute prohibits an activity, it regulates it. 
192. See, e.g., United States v. Faasse, 265 F.3d 475, 489–91 (6th Cir. 2001) (en 
banc) (stating that the court could find that the CSRA validly regulates 
“financial obligations” having a substantial effect on commerce). 
193. Cf. Kathleen A. Burdette, Comment, Making Parents Pay: Interstate Child 
Support Enforcement After United States v. Lopez, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1469, 
1506 (1996) (suggesting that child support should be viewed as a commercial 
transaction because it involves “an exchange of value in the form of money”). 
194. Cf. Faasse, 265 F.3d at 496 (Batchelder, J., dissenting) (characterizing a 
child support order as mandating a “transfer of wealth” and therefore 
suggesting that a child support debt is not “commercial in nature”); but see 
United States v. Gray, 260 F.3d 1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
robbery constitutes an economic activity because it involuntarily transfers 
assets). 
195. See, e.g., U.S. v. King, 276 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that the 
CSRA regulates a thing in commerce within Lopez’s category two); Faasse, 
265 F.3d at 489 (majority opinion) (same). 
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A circuit split has developed on the question of whether robbery, 
regulated under the Hobbs Act, constitutes an economic activity, a le-
gitimate question unresolved by the Lopez guidance.196 A federal statute 
shielding rental car companies from state tort liability has not 
generated a circuit split, but perhaps it should have. The appellate 
courts have usually treated this law as regulating the commercial act-
ivity of renting out cars.197 But it is not obvious that this view is correct. 
This law imposes no obligations on rental car companies, so it may be 
error to suggest that it regulates their activities. The law deregulates 
the activity of renting cars by shielding car rental companies from tort 
liability.198 Accordingly, some judges have viewed this statute as regu-
lating the activity of suing in tort.199 The judges viewing it that way 
have found that the statute regulates noneconomic activity.200 A tort 
suit itself does not constitute consumption, production, or distribution 
of commodities under Raich. So, Lopez’s guidance, while helpful, hardly 
resolves all important ambiguities.201 
Even in cases where the Lopez guidance cannot resolve all ambi-
guities it can contribute something to their resolution. Raich may not 
rule out an argument that a tort suit, in which somebody pays a lawyer 
to seek a monetary award, constitutes an economic activity, when 
interpreted in light of Lopez’s breadth.202 The Lopez concurrence’s en-
dorsement of a broad functional approach to interpreting the economic 
activity concept and its preservation of prior precedent shows that the 
 
196. See United States v. McFarland, 311 F.3d 376, 395 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) 
(suggesting that it agrees with the 7th Circuit, but disagrees with the 10th 
and 11th Circuits on this question). 
197. See, e.g., Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 540 F.3d 1242, 1252 
(11th Cir. 2008) (upholding the shielding of rental car companies from tort 
liability because the shield regulates the commercial activity of vehicle 
leasing); Graham v. Dunkley, 852 N.Y.S.2d 169, 174 (A.D. 2 Dept. 2008) 
(same). 
198. Cf. Nat’l Fed. of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587–91, 2644 (2012) 
(dicta of five Justices) (stating that the Commerce Clause does not 
authorize Congress to compel citizens to engage in required activities). 
199. Graham v. Dunkley, 827 N.Y.S.2d 513, 524 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006), rev’d, 
852 N.Y.S.2d 169 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (characterizing the statute as 
regulating “the pursuit of justice”). 
200. See, e.g., id. (finding that the “pursuit of justice” does not constitute an 
economic activity and “has nothing to do with commerce”). 
201. See Stampolis v. Provident Auto Leasing Co., 586 F. Supp. 88, 101–02 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (characterizing the liability shield as regulating the lease 
transaction itself). 
202. See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005) (defining economics as the 
production, consumption, and distribution of commodities, but not explicitly 
limiting the economic activity concept to those three items). 
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Raich definition of economics, which narrowly focuses on commodities, 
cannot constitute an inflexible limit on the concept’s reach.203 Lopez 
shows that regulation of hotels and restaurants, which offer services 
rather than produce commodities, constitute regulation of economic 
activity. Thus, courts must consider Raich’s definition of economics in 
the context of the broad functional approach to economic activity 
articulated in Lopez. 
Although some ambiguities persist in spite of Lopez’s guidance, the 
inherent ambiguity of the economic activity concept may not constitute 
the greatest impediment to the guidance’s efficacy in yielding consistent 
applications of the economic activity concept. The economic activity 
concept has its vagaries, but on the whole it does not seem as 
ambiguous as the old indirect/direct effects dichotomy.204 On the other 
hand, the economic/noneconomic distinction seems much more am-
biguous than the highly criticized distinction between commerce, on the 
one hand, and mining and manufacturing on the other. But formalism’s 
uncertainty does not come only from the ambiguity of the verbal form-
ulas judges announce. Rather, it also stems from the verbal tests’ lack 
of correspondence with the concerns that tend to control opinions.205 
The exemption of mining and manufacturing from Commerce Clause 
regulation hardly lacked verbal clarity; but it lacked a sensible rationale 
and, therefore, the distinction between those activities and sales 
appeared as an arbitrary distinction. The same has been said of the 
economic/noneconomic activity distinction.206 
Judges often fail to heed Lopez’s guidance, because they want to 
minimize impediments to reaching ultimate conclusions that make 
sense. So, for example, the appellate courts have agreed that the Free-
dom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE) regulates an activity 
having a substantial effect on commerce because the protected health 
clinics engage in interstate transactions.207 But some of the courts up-
 
203. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 
F.3d 208, 224–25 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that wagering and national sports, 
neither of which involve commodities, constitute economic activity). 
204. Accord Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 Tex. 
L. Rev. 1, 137 (2004). 
205. See Ides, supra note 9, at 575–76 (arguing that the formalist approach fails 
because judges adjust the cases to address “the felt necessities of society”). 
206. See, e.g., Young, supra note 204, at 137 (describing the claim that the 
distinction between commercial and noncommercial activity is arbitrary as 
the “primary objection” to the distinction). 
207. See, e.g., Norton v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 547, 559 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that 
obstructing health clinic operations has “disrupted the national market for 
abortion-related services”); United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 263 (3d Cir. 
2000) (holding that FACE “has a substantial effect on the interstate 
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holding this statute have ignored Lopez’s guidance about how to char-
acterize activities as economic, characterizing blocking access to a 
health clinic as an economic activity, because it has an economic 
effect.208 That conclusion flatly contradicts the reasoning employed in 
Lopez and Morrison, but it removes a potential impediment to reaching 
a decision upholding the statute. In the case of the liability shield for 
rental car companies, a state court judge who characterized tort suits 
as a noneconomic activity made it quite clear that he considered the 
federal shield an inappropriate interference with state tort law.209 Thus, 
he may well have found that a tort suit constitutes a noneconomic 
activity, notwithstanding the need to pay lawyers and the prayer for 
damages, because that finding helped justify invalidating the statute. 
Furthermore, judges, in a number of cases, have recited the 
economic/noneconomic activity distinction, but then failed to apply it 
at all, instead reaching the results that they prefer without the 
inconvenience of stating whether it regulates economic activity or not.210 
 
commerce of reproductive health services”); Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 
587 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that FACE regulates activities having a direct 
effect on the interstate market for reproductive health care services); U.S. v. 
Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 678 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that FACE-regulated 
activities have a substantial effect on interstate markets in abortion services). 
208. See, e.g., Norton, 298 F.3d at 556 (squarely holding that obstructing health 
clinic operations is an economic activity because it has a direct economic 
effect); Gregg, 226 F.3d at 262 (same); but see Gregg, 226 F.3d at 269–70 
(Weiss, J., dissenting) (finding the activity regulated by FACE criminal and 
noneconomic); Bird, 124 F.3d at 688 (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (finding that 
the use of force to interfere with health clinic access is not part of a 
commercial activity); U.S. v. Bird, 279 F. Supp. 827, 837 (S.D. Tex. 2005), 
order vacated, 401 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2005) (characterizing regulated “anti-
abortion activities” as noneconomic).  
209. See Graham v. Dunkley, 827 N.Y.S.2d 513, 522–24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006), 
rev’d, 852 N.Y.S.2d 513 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (discussing the traditional 
role of the state in defining the common law of tort and concluding that the 
federal statute “subverts” the New York State Legislature’s authority). 
210. See, e.g., City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. 524 F.3d 384, 393–94 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (not squarely addressing the question of whether a statute 
protecting gun manufacturers from tort liability should be viewed as a 
regulation of civil litigation because the unidentified regulated activity has a 
“far more direct” effect on commerce than the activities at issue in Lopez and 
Morrison); Green v. Toyota Motor CreditCorp, 605 F. Supp. 2d 430, 435–36 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (upholding the statute shielding rental companies from tort 
liability without mentioning or applying the economic activity concept); 
Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., v. Druin, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1349–51 
(S.D. Fla. 2007), rev’d, 2009 WL 995141 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting Morrison’s 
economic activity requirement, but invalidating the statute limiting the tort 
liability of car rental companies without determining whether it regulates 
economic activity); U.S. v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325, 332–333 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(overturning a child pornography conviction not involving a pedophile when 
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Thus, the desire to reach results that appear sensible to judges, whether 
based on allegiance to categorical federalism or economic reality, may 
control, and sometimes distort, the application of the economic activity 
concept to actual cases.211 The tendency to apply the economic activity 
concept to support results reached on other grounds has sometimes 
generated inconsistent applications of the economic activity concept 
and therefore limits the guidance’s utility. 
Conclusion 
Lopez offers guidance that should help courts apply the economic 
activity concept to Commerce Clause cases. This guidance makes that 
concept more multidimensional than some had thought. Furthermore, 
arguments about statutory benefits apparently ruled out by Lopez’s 
exclusive focus on regulatory targets can be reformulated in terms of 
regulated activities’ effects. The Lopez guidance has informed lower 
court characterizations of activities, leading to fewer arbitrary restric-
tions on federal authority than some have feared. At the same time, 
this guidance does not resolve all ambiguities and does not resolve 
fundamental theoretical problems that limit verbal formulas’ capacity 
to control decisions in this area. Nor does the existence of guidance 
show that the distinction makes good normative sense. 
 
the girl photographed was months away from turning eighteen without 
reaching a conclusion about the economic nature of the activity). 
211. But see Hoffman, 126 F.3d at 587 (finding that FACE regulates non-
commercial conduct and upholding it anyway); Bird, 124 F.3d at 675 (5th 
Cir. 1997) (same). 
